



SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA  
**EDISON**<sup>®</sup>

(U 338-E)

# Southern California Edison Q1 2025 Quarterly Data Report

May 1, 2025

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## **I. INTRODUCTION**

Pursuant to the Office of Energy Infrastructure Safety's (OEIS, or Energy Safety) Final Data Guidelines v4.01 that were adopted on February 28, 2025 (Data Guidelines), this Q1 2025 Quarterly Data Report (QDR) includes Southern California Edison Company's (SCE) (1) Geographic Information System (GIS) geodatabase v4.01 and the related Spatial Status Report v4.01, in Excel, that further denotes what spatial data SCE is providing at this time; (2) Wildfire Mitigation Data Tables, in Excel, pursuant to Energy Safety's Wildfire Mitigation Data Table template for Tables 1-15 v4.01; and (3) a description of the data included in the GIS database and Wildfire Mitigation Data Tables.

SCE appreciates Energy Safety's acknowledgment that utilities are at various stages of their data journey and that the Data Guidelines are intended to be a phased approach including ongoing changes to the GIS schema. The confidential geodatabase is being submitted directly to Energy Safety. Pursuant to the California Code of Regulations, Title 14, Division 17, Chapter 1, Article 3, Section 29200, SCE has attached its application for confidential designation of the data provided within the Q1 2025 QDR.

SCE is in the process of identifying changes in prior quarterly data and the best approach to provide updates to Energy Safety. SCE appreciates Energy Safety's understanding as we update our internal QDR processes to better align with the requirements set out in Data Guidelines v4.01 Section 2.4.

## II. GEOSPATIAL DATA

Based on the Data Guidelines, this QDR provides recorded GIS data for the January through March 2025 period and planned GIS data where available.

SCE has identified the following items to provide additional clarity on certain activities:

- For 2025 reporting, SCE has updated the spatial and non-spatial QDRs to better align with the most recent OEIS Data Guidelines v4.01. The updated QDRs provide required information under the most recent version of the Data Guidelines and focus on data associated with activities set forth in SCE's Wildfire Mitigation Plan.
- Planned work for Q1 2025 will not include geometry information because that data is not yet available in source systems.
- HFTD Class will reflect null if a location is not yet mapped in SCE's system of record at the time of filing. The null designation is intended to avoid confusion. SCE had previously categorized structures as being in Non-HFTD until the system of record was updated with location information.
- PSPS QDR Circuit and Customer Count vary slightly from SCE's Q1 PSPS Post-Event Reports (PERs) as Q1 activations included five sub-transmission circuits and three distribution circuits with zero customer load, which are typically not captured in our GIS/GDB submission. SCE will work to add logic to our QDR to capture these events going forward.
- WMP projects can be planned for circuits that traverse in and out of high fire areas. SCE may include non-high fire structures within these work orders, as they are typically near the HFTD boundary and support assets traversing high fire areas.
- SH-1 Covered Conductor
  - All structures related to the work order design for covered conductor installations are included in the QDR reported data.
- Currently, seven WM-2 records are marked as Non-HFTD. These structures were originally marked as HFTD during the scoping process and work was completed with the best available data at the time.
- Critical Facility count has dropped for Q1 reporting as SCE's critical infrastructure flag is currently being reviewed and updated. Counts will normalize after May 1, 2025.

No work completions/installations were recorded for the following activities in Q1:

- IN-3 Infrared Inspection of Energized Overhead Distribution Facilities and Equipment
- IN-5 Generation High Fire Risk-Informed Inspections and Remediations in HFRA
- IN-9b Transmission Conductor & Splice Assessment: Splices with X-Ray
- SH-10 Tree Attachment Remediation
- SH-17 Rapid Earth Fault Current Limiter (REFCL) Ground Fault Neutralizer

- SH-18 Rapid Earth Fault Current Limiter (REFCL) Grounding Conversion
- SH-5 Remote Controlled Automatic Reclosers Settings Update
- SH-6 Circuit Breaker Relay Hardware for Fast Curve
- SH-8 Transmission Open Phase Detection
- VM-1 Hazard Tree Management Program (Transmission)
- VM-3 Projects Expanded Clearances for Legacy Facilities (Polygon)
- VM-4 Dead and Dying Tree Removal (Transmission)

This QDR includes the geospatial Initiative,<sup>1</sup> Asset Point, Asset Line, PSPS and Risk Events, and Other Required Data datasets.

SCE appreciates that Energy Safety, through its comprehensive, updated Data Guidelines, intends to obtain and standardize significant amounts of wildfire-related data. SCE also understands Energy Safety's desire to understand our current systems and data availability. To this end, SCE also provides updated responses in the Status Report in the Excel file template that generally describe the status of the requested data fields, actions we plan to take if a particular data field is not being provided at this time, the timeline for completing those actions, and whether the data is confidential. SCE describes its approach to the updated Status Report.

SCE also notes that it does not capture several data elements that still require time for our teams and subject matter experts to assess with respect to the labor, operational, system and technical requirements. Where available, SCE provides more details of our submission at the Feature Class level within the accompanying GIS Status Report. While SCE understands that Energy Safety desires specific timelines to address all data gaps, we are not able to provide all assessments with this QDR submission.

Like its previous QDR, SCE is providing the requested spatial data in the geodatabase. Additionally, SCE is submitting an updated Status Report based on the datasets described above. SCE notes that it continues to take a phased approach to improve the data being provided. SCE looks forward to continued collaboration with Energy Safety, utilities, and other stakeholders to refine and improve the Data Guidelines.

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<sup>1</sup> The Initiative dataset includes grid hardening, vegetation management (projects & inspections), and asset inspections initiatives where work was performed and/or projected to be performed in HFRA over the reporting periods.

### III. WILDFIRE MITIGATION DATA TABLES 1-15

#### **Introduction:**

SCE provides Wildfire Mitigation Data Tables 1-15 pursuant to the requirements in the Data Guidelines v4.01.

The information provided in conjunction with ignition events and “utility-ignited” wildfire statistics in Tables 1-15 should not be construed as an admission of any wrongdoing or liability by SCE. SCE further notes that the damages metrics provided may be tracked by other agencies and thus SCE does not guarantee the accuracy of such information. Additionally, in many instances the cause of wildfires is still under investigation and even where an Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) has issued a report on the cause, SCE may dispute the conclusions of such report.

SCE provides data for all Wildfire Mitigation Data Tables and is also including additional information for some of the tables to provide further clarification:

#### **Table 1: Quarterly Initiative Update (QIU)**

SCE notes that Targets are described in several documents including the QDR and throughout the 2023-2025 WMP. While SCE has made efforts to align the language and numerical values across these locations, in the case of discrepancies, SCE’s intention is for Table 1 to serve as the authoritative and governing source for the Targets. For Table 1 actuals, SCE notes that the current quarter is updated, and no revisions are made to previous quarters. Totals will align with each quarter’s submitted Quarterly Narrative Letter (QNL).

#### **Table 2: Performance Metrics**

For 2025 reporting, SCE updated the filter criteria for Table 2 to provide notifications and inspections data associated with WMP program-related inspections only. Table 2 does not include data associated with AGP (annual grid patrol), transmission patrol, IPI (intrusive pole inspection), PLP and PLC (pole loading programs), certain miscellaneous conditions identified by crews or troublemen apart from inspections activities, or notifications found in non-high fire areas.

- **Time Between Inspection and Resulting Remediation:**

SCE interprets these data points to include only closed work orders (notifications) that were completed on Jan. 1, 2020, or later and identified through an overhead inspection program (e.g., risk-informed ground inspection, aerial, etc.) regardless of date that the finding was identified. Included in this calculation are work orders that have been subject to external constraints such as permitting, access constraints, and/or long lead time environmental clearances that may have extended the remediation time. Furthermore, work orders identified as a Level 1 condition (i.e., Priority 1) are emergent and made safe for the public within 24 hours. The resulting permanent repair may extend longer due to material availability, customer access, and/or local permitting requirements.

- **Asset / Vegetation Management Open and Past-Due Work Orders**

SCE provides open and past-due work order (notifications) counts as a snapshot in time at the end of each quarter. These figures include work orders that may have been constrained due to external factors that are outside of SCE’s control (e.g., permitting and customer access) and

include only work identified through inspection programs.

Asset management work orders are defined as past-due when the repair has not been completed by the GO 95 specified compliance timeframes or SCE's internal due date, whichever is sooner.

Vegetation management work orders are defined as past-due based on the clearance distances at time of inspection as recommended by GO 95, Rule 35, when the required trimming activity has not been completed by SCE's prescribed internal timeframes:

- **30 Days:** Trees with clearances less than the Regulation Clearance Distance (RCD)
  - **90 Days:** Trees with clearances less than the RCD and are less than or equal to the Trigger Clearance Distance (TCD)
- **Circuit Mile Conversion:**

SCE accounts for completed inspections by noting the counts of assets inspected instead of noting by circuit miles. To present completed inspections in the requested format, SCE uses a calculated average span length multiplied by the number of structures inspected. Unique span length multipliers are used for Transmission and Distribution and HFRA and Non-HFRA calculations.
  - **Inspection Methods:**

SCE provides counts of structures inspected, circuit miles inspected, grid condition findings and fixes from inspections where applicable. SCE does not differentiate its inspections in its system of record by the exact methods provided by OEIS. For the methods that SCE does not utilize, SCE has provided values in the blank meaning column to account for the null rows.
  - **Value of assets destroyed by utility-related ignitions:**

The information provided in conjunction with all of the "utility-ignited" wildfire statistics in tables 1-13 should not be construed as an admission of any wrongdoing or liability by SCE or concession that the wildfire was actually caused by SCE equipment. SCE is required to submit an Electric Safety Incident Report when certain criteria are met, including any allegation that an incident is attributed to SCE equipment, even if there is no evidence supporting such allegation. SCE further notes that the damages metrics provided may be tracked by other agencies and thus, SCE does not guarantee the accuracy of such information. Additionally, in many instances the cause of wildfires are still under investigation and even where an Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) has issued a report on the cause, SCE may dispute the conclusions of such report. Ignition costs include only those repair WOs that have been closed by time of report out. Additional costs may still be pending.

Given SCE's ongoing review into the cause of the Eaton Fire and, among other things, the complexities associated with estimating damages and uncertainties as to the causes that contributed to damages SCE is currently unable to reasonably estimate an ignition cost metric associated with the Eaton Fire.

- **Response Time**

For metric 8a, data for crew response time to a locked circuit breaker incident is not readily

available for instances not involving hazard conditions such as 911 or wire down calls. SCE will continue to review the available information in its outage systems to provide this information in a future filing. Currently, any quarterly data would reflect only 911 and wire down events and is not a good representation of SCE's overall response time.

- **Community Outreach Metrics**

For metric 17a, SCE has no jurisdiction over evacuation orders. SCE diligently requested and followed up with local governments and law enforcement and was only able to obtain information from one county. Even then, the information provided included high-level estimations of evacuation counts estimated by the local government and law enforcement entity for a limited number of fires. Because of this, SCE is unable to obtain the requested data, analyze it, and report on evacuation related requirements in this table. SCE anticipates this to be a recurring challenge going forward.

**Table 3: List and Description of Additional Metrics**

In Table 3, SCE identifies several performance metrics which may be helpful to inform evaluation of the performance of SCE's wildfire mitigation portfolio. SCE identified metrics because WMP activities are designed to reduce wildfire ignitions associated with its electrical infrastructure and reduce the impact of PSPS de-energization events to customers. Importantly, these metrics are within the reasonable control of utilities when appropriately normalized for weather and other exogenous factors. Other metrics such as safety incidents, acres burned or structures destroyed, though important to understand, track, and monitor, are impacted by events and circumstances outside of the utility's control such as climate change, droughts, fire suppression efforts and fire response.

Metrics and underlying data are critical components for WMP development, execution, and evaluation, but we continue to emphasize that the near-term focus should be on efficient implementation of our planned activities, while the assessment of whether the activities are having the desired and expected impact on risk reduction should be measured over a longer time horizon. A clear distinction is necessary between initiative targets as outlined in Table 1 that establish goals and monitor compliance with approved WMPs and metrics that evaluate effectiveness of these approved plans and inform future WMP updates. As stated in previous filings and submittals, tracking initiative targets for approved WMPs is the best means of determining progress and assessing WMP compliance in the near-term.

**Tables 4: Weather Patterns:** No additional clarification is needed at this time.

**Tables 5 & 6: Risk Event & Ignition Drivers:** No additional clarification is needed at this time.

**Table 7: State of Service Territory and Utility Equipment:** No additional clarification is needed at this time.

**Tables 8 Location of Utility Equipment Additions and Removals:** No additional clarification is needed at this time.

**Tables 9: Location of Infrastructure Upgrades:** SCE provides equipment upgrade data where available. In some instances, the exact circuit and/or geospatial locational data and line lengths

required are not available at the time of reporting. This is due in part to detailed designs not yet completed for certain infrastructure projects (e.g., detailed design for projects requiring a Permit to Construct or a CPCN from the CPUC do not begin until the Commission approves the project). Where detailed design is available, SCE is working internally to begin incorporating the geospatial data needed to provide these data points for future submissions.

**Table 10: Recent Use of PSPS and Other PPS Metrics:**

- **Fast-Trip Events and Unplanned Outages Resulting from Fast Trip**

SCE provides all outages that have occurred while fast-trip settings were enabled. This does not mean that those outages would only have occurred because of fast trip. Sensitive protection settings are designed to activate quickly when a fault is detected by de-energizing a circuit or circuit segment which minimizes the overall fault energy and reduces the probability of ignition. SCE’s fast trip settings are enabled during times of increased fire risk (red flag warning, fire weather threat, fire climate zone threat, or thunderstorm threat).

**Table 13: Open Work Orders/Notifications**

For 2025 reporting, SCE updated the filter criteria for Table 13 to provide notifications associated with WMP program-related inspections only. This means that Table 13 does not include AGP (annual grid patrol), transmission patrol, IPI (intrusive pole inspection), PLP and PLC (pole loading programs), certain miscellaneous conditions identified by crews or troublemen apart from inspections activities, or notifications found in non-high fire areas.